On the relationship between science and politics

It’s only getting more complicated…

The climate crisis was a marginal issue in debates preceding Germany’s recent federal election. Since then, public disinterest in this issue has, in some quarters, hardened into outright hostility. An Allensbach survey, for example, reveals a marked decline in support for the energy transition. As reported by Spiegel Online, opposition towards current climate policy is particularly widespread in eastern Germany, among lower socio-economic groups, and among voters of the AfD and FDP. Concerns over domestic and international security, energy prices, and the economic downturn appear to have eclipsed the climate crisis. These concurrent crises are fostering uncertainty, eroding trust in democratic institutions, and contributing to the resurgence of right-wing populism—an observation that is widely shared.

Policies aimed at addressing climate and sustainability issues struggle to gain traction under these circumstances. As highlighted by the 2025 RIFS Conference Tough Conversations in Tough Times, we are experiencing a turn away from evidence-based debate towards cultural conflict, deeply held convictions, and affective responses. Science communication, however compelling and skilfully crafted, is proving ineffective in arenas where questions of identity and personal beliefs take precedence, as closed worldviews are immune to contradictory evidence.  
 

This blog post is part of a series on the 2025 RIFS Conference "Tough Conversations in Tough Times".

This changing context is reshaping science and climate communication, as well as the broader relationship between science and politics, on multiple levels, as I will discuss briefly here. These shifts warrant further in-depth discussion. 

1. The evolving situation in the USA highlights the vulnerability of academic freedom to right-wing populism. In Germany, the AfD routinely castigates experts in the fields of gender and postcolonial studies, and its parliamentary group in Brandenburg recently requested the defunding of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). “The AfD’s national election manifesto calls for more reliable vaccine testing and at the state level the party has attacked sustainability science [as a tool of the global elite] and solar power research at the Fraunhofer Institute [claiming that findings are dubious]," explains Andreas Fischer-Lescano of the University of Kassel.  
   
   These attacks on academic freedom are likely to escalate into tangible threats should the AfD gain power. Scientific institutions—including universities and research communities—must prepare for this eventuality and present a unified front to defend against these challenges. What mechanisms are needed to bolster resilience against future challenges? What communication strategies must be developed to shape the narrative and avoid being forced into a defensive posture? The earlier a systematic effort is undertaken to address these questions, the more effective the response will be. 
    

2. Even without holding executive power, right-wing populists already wield considerable influence, as seen in the increasingly polarised debate on immigration. A similar discursive shift is evident in the debate surrounding climate change. While surveys show that over 70 per cent of the population in Germany remains concerned about climate change, populist framing of climate action as ‘climate hysteria’ has shifted the discourse. Climate action is now increasingly viewed not as a rational necessity—as it was during the height of the Fridays for Future movement—but as an ideological position that calls for an open response based on a variety of technological solutions, rather than on guidelines for regulating the market. 

   Climate communication is responding to this shift by prioritizing positive narratives. The emphasis has moved away from Thunberg’s “I want you to panic” and towards highlighting the benefits of climate protection: energy independence through wind and solar power, improved air quality thanks to the sustainable mobility options, and improved health outcomes thanks to active mobility and more plant-based food. However, this approach—let’s call it “implicit climate communication”—risks inadvertently shifting the discourse. If the threat that climate change poses to livelihoods disappears from public debate, it will become easier to dismiss climate action as merely an ideology, a lifestyle, and part of the “woke agenda”. 

   This doesn’t mean that doomsday scenarios need take centre stage again—on the contrary. Without a positive vision of the future, and the courage and willingness to change, the transformation will fail. But if climate change truly concerns most citizens, the benefits of climate action can be highlighted alongside the negative consequences of maintaining the status quo. We can build more wind turbines or devastate landscapes with open-pit mining. That is the choice we face.
    

3. This shift in discourse is also succeeding because climate deniers are particularly vocal and insistent. Discussions about renewables often get side-tracked by debates over the very existence of climate change or the question of human causation, rather than focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of wind power in a specific location, for example. And social media algorithms amplify simple answers to complex questions. X, formerly a major platform for science communication, has increasingly become a fact-free space for conspiracy theories, leading many scientists and institutions to abandon it. There are, and were, many good reasons for taking this step, but it doesn’t mean science can fundamentally avoid engaging with communication spaces influenced by right-wing populists. Transdisciplinary research, in particular, cannot afford to ignore these spaces. 

   Context plays a significant role in shaping engagement with right-wing populist narratives and with climate deniers in particular. When Tino Chrupalla appears on Caren Miosga’s current affairs TV-show, his goal isn’t to exchange arguments, but to reinforce the emotional worldview of his followers by emphasizing certain ‘trigger points’ (Steffen Mau et al.). Interviewers face a predicament: rigorous and critical questioning risks reinforcing the populist narrative of a ‘left-leaning media cartel’ – often invoked in Germany using the historical accusation of ‘Lügenpresse’ (lying press). Conversely, uncritical discussion risks normalizing what are, to some extent, far- and extreme-right talking points. The question of whether public broadcasters ARD and ZDF are obligated not only to report on the AfD, but also to host AfD politicians on talk shows, remains a legally and politically contentious issue. However, scientific institutions have greater latitude in this regard and should avoid providing right-wing populist figures with a platform at conferences or meetings, as they deliberately seek to derail substantive discussions through provocation.

   In other settings, such as public hearings, citizens’ assemblies, or local politics, engaging with these viewpoints is unavoidable. While reasoned arguments are unlikely to sway individuals holding right-wing populist beliefs, it can be effective to challenge the totalitarian claims inherent in their narratives and conclude the discussion with a respectful ‘agree to disagree.’ Preparing for this new style of dialogue is crucial, for example through sharing experiences and best practice examples with colleagues and participating in relevant training. 
    

4. Policy advice is another area in which the relationship between science and politics must be recalibrated. With representatives in all of Germany’s state parliaments, and as the largest opposition group in the Bundestag, the AfD has significantly altered the tenor of political debate. As a ‘working parliament’, the Bundestag routinely incorporates scientific testimony and expert reports into its deliberations. However, a study by the Bertelsmann Foundation has found that members of the AfD routinely employ disruptive tactics, ranging from verbal attacks and loud interruptions to personal insults. 

   This dynamic extends to interactions with scientists, as demonstrated by the recent parliamentary inquiry on The Corona Pandemic and Lessons for Future Pandemic Events. During the hearings, special advisers invited to join the inquiry by the AfD attempted to confine responses to simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers, despite the protracted and complex nature of their questions. Follow-up questions to expert witnesses such as renowned virologist Christian Drosten were frequently framed as requests for confirmation: “Do you agree that…?” The intent to downplay the dangers of the coronavirus pandemic and portray the German government’s containment measures as grossly exaggerated was readily apparent. While political motives have long played a role in such inquiries, conflicts typically unfolded among parliamentarians, rather than with the scientific experts. The overtly adversarial nature of the AfD’s questioning introduces a novel dynamic, effectively precluding any possibility of science fulfilling its role as an honest broker. Consequently, scientific advice to policymakers will inevitably need to include a discussion of the political values that shape decisions.
    

These examples demonstrate that the shift in the political landscape brought about by right-wing populism will impact science, communication, and the relationship between science and politics. It is crucial to anticipate the consequences and develop effective strategies for addressing them.