Committed to Democracy: Why Neutrality Is Not the Answer to Polarisation

Whether it’s electric cars, heat pumps, gender issues or migration: a deep rift runs through our society. At least, that is what 81 per cent of Germans believe. Or is this narrative simply being drummed into us? Polarisation, so the argument goes, threatens democracy and social cohesion. Increasingly, researchers are examining just how polarised German society is and how we can depolarise it through strategies such as public dialogue, media campaigns, and institutional reforms. But how helpful is it to view our society through the lens of polarisation? Is democracy really primarily threatened by an allegedly polarised society? Or is this idea a distraction from other important factors, such as a broader shift to the right or the erosion of the welfare state? 

Ideological versus affective polarisation

Generally speaking, polarisation refers to a process in which attitudes diverge significantly between relatively stable social groups. However, most academic studies distinguish between ideological and affective polarization. Ideological polarization describes the growing divide between opposing political opinions and attitudes, and is an integral and even necessary feature of democratic negotiation processes and party-political competition. When political differences translate into emotional antagonism, we speak of affective polarisation. The term was coined in the USA in reference to the widening gulf between the opposing political camps of the Democratic and Republican parties. In processes of affective polarisation, people from different political camps come to view one another with hostility and mistrust. 

What does the evidence say? 

There is a growing body of literature on polarisation in Germany. In the 2023 bestseller Triggerpunkte, Steffen Mau et al. found that German society is less divided than is often assumed. Rather, the authors observe that conflicts are being fuelled around specific issues. The 2025 Science Barometer reaches a similar conclusion, finding that German society is significantly more polarised on the issue of gender-neutral language than on climate change, migration, or social inequality. The 2025 Polarisation Barometer observes high levels of ideological and emotional polarisation in relation to climate protection and support for Ukraine, as well as in attitudes towards sexual minorities and rainbow flags. 

One year after the publication of this data, a look at these issues seems to confirm the thesis put forward by Mau et al. that opinions, fuelled by political actors and certain media outlets, become temporarily polarised around specific topics. Building on this insight, sociologist Nils Kumkar argues that we should focus less on polarisation itself and more on the communication of polarisation. For example ‘polarisation entrepreneurs’, such as political and media actors who deliberately create divisions. Similarly, journalist Gilda Sahebi observes that divisive narratives – such as those about good and bad migrants or ‘gender wokism’ – are often propagated by centrist politicians and taken up by the media. 

Is democracy under threat from a shift to the right or from polarisation? 

There are many arguments to suggest that polarisation can lead to the erosion of democracy. The informal rules of democracy – such as the acceptance of election results and respect for minority rights – can lose their binding power. Secondly, polarisation can undermine trust not only in the opposing party, but also in shared institutions – elections, the judiciary, the media, academia. Research from the USA also shows that highly polarised citizens are more likely to tolerate or support authoritarian behaviour by politicians from their own party. 

But does the danger really stem from the polarisation of two opposing camps? According to the 2025 Science and Polarisation Barometer, the population groups considered to be the most polarised are, on the one hand, the core voters of the Green Party, followed by those of The Left (Die Linke), and on the other hand, the AfD. But can we really measure these voter groups with a single yardstick? After all, the AfD regularly violates democratic norms and rules and calls minority rights into question, whereas the other group seeks to defend them. 

According to Eversberg, therefore, viewing the situation through the lens of polarisation falls short. In his 2024 study Der neue sozial-ökologische Klassenkonflikt, he and his team argue for a more nuanced examination of social groups and identify so-called socio-economic mentalities, which can be divided into three spectra: a socio-ecological spectrum, a growth-oriented conservative spectrum, and a reactive-defensive spectrum. A comparison of their data from the years 2021/22 and 2023/24 shows a shift away from sustainability-oriented positions. While socio-ecological mindsets have lost ground, the conservative centre has moved closer to defensive-reactive positions.

A “shameless normalisation”

The shift of the conservative centre to the right is also outlined in the so-called Mitte Study (The Tense Middle – Right-wing Extremist and Democratic Attitudes in Germany 2024/25). The study highlights the extent to which far-right terms and ideologies, such as “foreign infiltration”, are being adopted – consciously or unconsciously – by people who place themselves in the centre of the political spectrum. This is described as a process of “shameless normalisation” of anti-democratic or right-wing populist positions. At the same time, statements such as Angela Merkel’s 2015 declaration that “[…]the fundamental right to political asylum does not allow for a limit on the number of asylum seekers” have become unthinkable – even from parties on the centre-left of the political spectrum. Similar shifts have occurred on the issues of the nuclear phase-out and electric cars. The axis of polarisation has thus shifted (at least on some issues) away from human rights and sustainability. Consequently, these latter issues now fall on the ‘left’ of the polarisation debate. The perception that two hostile political camps are pitted against one another, and the attempt to reconcile these camps, distracts from this shift, which can also be understood as an attack on fundamental democratic values. 

The danger of viewing things through the lens of polarisation: supposed neutrality

The notion that a polarised society can be reconciled by adopting a supposedly neutral stance or simply by embracing more diverse views has become increasingly prevalent in mainstream discourse. For instance, at a media camp in April 2026, the editor-in-chief of German weekly Die Zeit was on the lookout for young conservative journalists to increase the diversity of perspectives within the editorial team. Similar developments are taking place in academia. There are increasingly vocal calls for greater neutrality in academia; for example, the Germany daily FAZ argues that “normative reshaping of the academic system (…) promotes social polarisation”, whilst Die Zeit notes that higher education used to be primarily about excellence. “Today, social policy is also on the agenda – a disastrous development.” What is referred to here as social policy are universities’ efforts to address diversity deficits and discrimination. 

Whilst there is no indication whatsoever that Germany’s universities have fallen behind in international rankings over the last decade, a glance at the US suggests how such statements can become harbingers of an increasingly restrictive funding policy. Even before Trump’s second term, terms such as “diversity, equity, inclusion” (DEI) had to be omitted in research applications if they were to stand a chance of receiving funding. We are now seeing in the USA both a coerced and a voluntary roll-back of DEI programmes in research institutions and companies. Is the ban on gender-neutral language in the Ministry of Culture here in Germany a harbinger of a similar trend? Who is sowing division here: those who ban gender-neutral language, or those who advocate for it?
 

What is needed now: two recommendations

We need to make a clear distinction when we talk about polarisation: Firstly, we should critically question the perception of our society as ‘polarised’ – that is, centred around a supposedly neutral middle ground. Otherwise, we – as advocates of transformative, sustainability-oriented research – might find ourselves at one end of the polarisation spectrum and be forced onto the defensive. To counter this, Jan-Martin Wiarda, former Head of Communications at the Helmholtz Association, suggests that “[…]we do not need to turn our backs on diversity, knowledge transfer or social responsibility – but rather to defend them more resolutely. We need a more honest debate on how these can be better organised and protected against attacks from the far right”. 

This goes hand in hand with the task of exposing divisive narratives for what they are and providing scientific evidence of how polarisation entrepreneurs are reshaping our understanding of ‘the centre’. Our priority should not be the reconciliation of two supposedly hostile camps, but a firm defence of democracy and sustainability against those who threaten them.