Science-Society Platforms

Everyone on Board for Climate Action? RIFS Fellow Examines UN Strategy for Civil Society Engagement

dha — Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:25:52 +0000

Everyone on Board for Climate Action? RIFS Fellow Examines UN Strategy for Civil Society Engagement dha Mon, 04/22/2024 - 17:25

Damian Harrison

RIFS Fellows

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"Politicians talk a lot about how we need to have everyone on board for the transition to a low-carbon economy. I'm interested in how this goal is impacting international policy forums," explains Lika. Numerous representatives from business, science and civil society attend the annual UN climate conferences – but to what extent do their interests enter into government negotiations? The 25-year-old lawyer wants to find out, first at the Bonn Climate Change Conference in June, where government representatives from around the world will meet to prepare the next COP, and then at COP29 in Azerbaijan in November.

Are young people being heard?

Lika is already familiar with the complex structures of the United Nations: in addition to studying law in Tirana, she worked for three years as a project coordinator at the United Nations Association of Albania. The participation of young people in UN processes and how different strategies are implemented to enhance their engagement for more effective climate action is also a focus of interest in her RIFS project.

In Bonn, she will observe the dialogues of the Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) programme, which aims to increase public support for and engagement in climate action through education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation.

How can the UN encourage participation?

"The implementation of the ACE programme is voluntary and so it is interesting to see what priorities countries set. My impression is that many tend to focus on education and training and have so far neglected public participation and public access to information. I would like to know why this is the case. Are there not enough resources? Are the structures inadequate? While all of the countries that engage with ACE have established educational structures and can include climate change in their school and university curricula, for example, structures for public participation are still underdeveloped in many countries," says Lika.

Deborah Lika's stay is funded by the German Federal Environmental Foundation as part of the Fellowships for University Graduates from Central and Eastern Europe (MOE).

RIFS Fellow Deborah Lika RIFS/Bianca Schröder

An active civil society is important in tackling climate change: it can push for new laws, hold the government accountable, and ensure that the interests of disadvantaged groups are addressed. It makes sense, then, that a growing number of civil society representatives are taking part in international negotiations such as the UN climate conferences. But how great is their impact? Deborah Lika hopes to answer this question during a year-long fellowship at RIFS. Deborah Lika

Science-Society Platforms 0

Methan: Ein kurzlebiges Gas mit weitreichender Wirkung

bsc — Fri, 12 Apr 2024 07:06:51 +0000

Methane: A Short-Lived Gas With Far-Reaching Effects dha Fri, 04/12/2024 - 14:09

Thomas Gentsch

The concentration of methane in the atmosphere has increased significantly in recent decades. Shutterstock/Vaclav Volrab

In March 2024, leading politicians and industry experts gathered in Geneva to tackle one of the most pressing challenges of our time: methane emissions. The participants discussed available methods to reduce methane emissions as called for under the Global Methane Pledge, which aims to cut global methane emissions by at least 30 percent by 2030 compared to 2020 levels. In this blog post, we take a closer look at why methane emissions matter and how they could be reduced.

Climate change and its consequences challenge us to gain a better understanding of the interactions between human activities and the atmosphere. One key element in this context is methane (CH₄), a greenhouse gas whose global warming potential far exceeds that of carbon dioxide (CO₂). Its effect can be quantified by its Global Warming Potential (GWP), which indicates the climate impact of a gas compared to CO₂ over a certain period of time. It is important to note that methane is a short-lived greenhouse gas with an atmospheric residence time of around twelve years. While the GWP of methane over 100 years (GWP100) is 27.9, its GWP over 20 years (GWP20) is 81.2. In other words: methane has an immense warming effect over a short period of time. Overall, approximately 30 percent of current global warming can be attributed to methane.

Methane’s global warming potential: two perspectives

The choice of assessment scale that is applied to a greenhouse gas has far-reaching implications for both climate strategies and the prioritization of measures aimed at reducing emissions. Whether these should focus primarily on the short-term effects of emissions over the coming decades, or their long-term effects over the course of a century, is highly contested.

While valuable insights can be gained from both observation periods, GWP100 has become the established benchmark in policy and scientific debates. But focussing on this long-term perspective risks neglecting the near-term effects of certain gases, such as methane.
The GWP20 scale provides an urgently needed focus on the short- to medium-term impacts of greenhouse gases and is especially relevant when it comes to short-lived greenhouse gases such as methane. In this perspective, rapid and targeted measures to reduce methane emissions could make a significant contribution to slowing global warming. This is particularly important with regard to the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Methane and the Paris climate goals

In the period from 2011 to 2020, the average temperature of the Earth's surface was 1.1 °C above the average for the years 1850 to 1900. It is predicted that global warming could exceed the 1.5 °C threshold established under the Paris Agreement between 2030 and 2052 if the current rate of temperature increase continues. Current estimates suggest that global warming caused by human activities will increase by around 0.2 °C per decade. Modelling of future scenarios shows that to meet the 1.5 °C target, global emissions of CO₂ related to human activities must be reduced by around 45 percent by 2030 compared to 2010 levels, with the aim of achieving net zero emissions by 2050.

In addition to its role as a greenhouse gas, methane is a precursor for ozone, an irritant gas that has significant negative effects on the health of humans and animals as well as plant vitality. Research suggests that a 45 percent reduction in methane emissions could prevent up to 255,000 premature deaths annually and reduce asthma-related hospitalizations by 775,000, while increasing global crop yields by around 26 million tons per year. A report by the Global Methane Alliance notes that a significant share of this reduction could be achieved with available technologies, with 60 percent of these interventions assessed as cost-effective. In particular, 50 percent of these measures would deliver financial gains, with the savings achieved exceeding associated costs.

In order to achieve the ambitious climate targets adopted under the Paris Agreement, it is essential that climate strategies address the full range of greenhouse gases, including methane. Moving GWP20 to the centre of debate could help to refocus climate policy on strategies that prioritize and deliver near-term measures to reduce methane emissions.

Current developments and the role of agriculture

Current climate scenarios predict an 8 percent increase in global methane emissions between 2020 and 2030. Three sectors account for the bulk of methane emissions worldwide: fossil fuels (~35 percent), agriculture (~40 percent) and waste (~20 percent). Within agriculture, livestock farming – and especially cattle – is the most significant source of methane emissions. In Germany, the agricultural sector accounts for around 75 percent of methane emissions (these figures are for domestic production, with imported goods playing a lesser role).

T. Gentsch, based on UBA

Effective strategies for reducing emissions of short-lived greenhouse gases in agriculture call for both technical solutions and changes in lifestyles, including reducing food waste and promoting a more sustainable consumption of animal products. The challenge lies in how we go about implementing such measures. While forcing people to change their lifestyles is probably impracticable, developing intelligent incentive systems and providing transparent information on products can help people to purchase more consciously. In Germany, the Citizens' Assembly on Nutrition has recommended the introduction of a state-backed sustainability label for all products sold within the EU so that consumers can identify products that are harmful to the climate or pose health risks. The assembly also recommended a sales tax reform that would exempt unprocessed, healthy foods such as fruit, vegetables and water from VAT, while increasing VAT to 19 percent on products with a high sugar content and meat produced using farming methods that are less animal-friendly (levels 1 and 2).

A call to reassess methane

The consideration of methane emissions and their near-term warming potential (GWP20) is crucial for the development of realistic climate strategies. Recent scientific findings emphasise the urgent need to significantly reduce methane emissions. This is essential not only to meet the ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement, but also to avoid harms to human, animal, and plant health. Measures to reduce methane emissions can reduce concentrations of harmful ground-level ozone and support the transition to a healthier diet. These findings should prompt policymakers to pursue and implement initiatives that will reduce methane emissions in order to address both environmental and health goals.
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Literature:

Bundestag, Deutscher: Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 20/10300 --- Bürgergutachten: Empfehlung des Bürgerrates " Ernährung im Wandel: Zwischen Privatangelegenheit und stattlichen Aufgaben" an den Deutschen Bundestag. Available online at https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/103/2010300.pdf, last accessed on 08.04.2024.

Climate and Clean Air Coalition (2022): Presentation of the results of the IPCC 2021, 2022.

Environmental Defence Fund (n.d.). Methane: A crucial opportunity in the climate fight https://www.edf.org/climate/methane-crucial-opportunity-climate-fight. Last accessed on 19 March 2024.

Global Methane Initiative | Global Methane Forum 2024 (2024). Available online at https://www.globalmethane.org/2024forum/, updated 08.04.2024, last accessed on 08.04.2024

Höglund-Isaksson, L., Gómez-Sanabria, A., Klimont, Z., Rafaj, P., & Schöpp, W. (2020). Technical potentials and costs for reducing global anthropogenic methane emissions in the 2050 timeframe results from the GAINS model. Environmental Research Communications, 2(2), 025004. https://doi.org/10.1088/2515-7620/ab7457

International Energy Agency. (2022). Global Methane Tracker 2022. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2022. Last accessed on 19 March 2024.

International Energy Agency. (2024). Global Methane Tracker 2024. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2024. Last accessed on 06 April 2024.

IPCC. (2018). Summary for Policymakers. In V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, H. O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J. B. R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M. I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, & T. Waterfield (Eds.), Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. World Meteorological Organization.

IPCC. (2023). Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, H. Lee & J. Romero (Eds.)]. https://doi.org/10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647

Methane Matters. (2021). Nature Geoscience, 14, 875. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-021-00875-1

Federal Environment Agency (UBA). (2023). Treibhausgas-Emissionen in Deutschland. https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/daten/klima/treibhausgas-emissionen-in-deutschland/methan-emissionen. Last accessed on 19 March 2024.

United Nations Environment Programme & Climate and Clean Air Coalition. (2021). Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions. United Nations Environment Programme.

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Thomas Gentsch Climate Action in National and International Processes (ClimAct) Science-Society Platforms

„Es braucht Kooperation, Beteiligung und Vertrauen für die Umsetzung“

slz — Tue, 19 Mar 2024 10:00:00 +0000

Cooperation, Participation, and Trust Essential to Achieving Sustainability dha Thu, 03/21/2024 - 10:21

Damian Harrison

Sustainable Brandenburg

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Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Minister Axel Vogel (Agriculture and Environment) began his opening address with a question: What role will sustainability play in this super election year? Citing recent studies, Vogel noted that 2023 was an exceptionally warm year compared to the period 1961–1990, and that February 2024 was the warmest February on record – with an average temperature of six degrees Celsius instead of the frosty sub-zero temperatures typical of this time of the year. He also pointed to a study published in 2023 which showed that “climate tipping points” are likely to be reached much faster than previously thought, causing considerable alarm. It is against this backdrop, the minister explained, that Brandenburg has adopted a climate action plan with the strategic goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2045. The minister lauded the role of diverse civil society actors in developing the plan and explained that work to implement many of the measures is already underway.

Vogel emphasised that – as with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – there is always more than one way of achieving the targets set out in the action plan and that they could only be secured through cooperation and with the support of civil society. “The action plan includes measures to engage and strengthen the role of the public in measures to protect the climate and promote sustainable development; Brandenburg’s Sustainability Platform is also identified as an instrument," said Vogel. “I am also counting on the involvement of the platform's members in other areas and invite you to help us achieve the plan’s broader goals." Vogel also acknowledged the challenges that lie in harnessing democratic process to secure a more sustainable future.

How do Brandenburg’s efforts to achieve the SDGs compare with the rest of Germany?

Speaking at the event, RIFS researcher Ira Matuschke compared Brandenburg's efforts to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to the rest of Germany and showed that the state is punching above its weight in some areas and underperforming in others. For example, Brandenburg ranks third among Germany’s sixteen states in its efforts to achieve SDG 7 – outperformed by just Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia – with renewable energy sources accounting for 23.8 percent of primary energy consumption in Brandenburg in 2020. It also ranks among the top three states with respect to Target 6.1.b of SDG 6: "Nitrate in groundwater: compliance with the threshold value of of 50 mg/l". However, as Matuschke explained, Brandenburg is underperforming in SDG 3 (Health and well-being), with a relatively high rate of premature mortality among males (per 100,000 inhabitants) in 2022. It appears that while Brandenburg is in a better position than many other states in terms of the condition of its forests and the share of renewables and organic farming, if the state is to achieve the goals set out in its sustainability strategy, more will need to be done in the areas of healthcare, investment in research and development, and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

Sustainability policy is always cooperation policy

Two panel discussions held over the course of the day revealed an overarching theme: the vital role of cooperation as a factor in transformations towards sustainability. Conflicts will inevitably arise as we pursue multiple sustainability goals, and different forms of cooperation are needed to help resolve conflicts and deliver constructive outcomes. "Sustainability policy is always cooperation policy," stated Ortwin Renn from RIFS Potsdam. Conflicts must be tackled across multiple levels – horizontally and vertically – in order to avoid achieving one goal at the expense of others. "We always need to consider the side effects and impacts of measures because when it comes to transformations, there is no black and white – just different shades of grey. And we need to engage with these head on – because no matter what course of action we decide upon on the political level, negative outcomes are always a possibility."

The broad participation of civil society in the development of sustainability policy and transformations is also crucial to efforts to achieve the SDGs. In this context, Renn criticised the oft-quoted maxim that policymakers need to “take people with them” as misrepresenting the role of citizens. Rather than assigning citizens the role of passive participants, we should be empowering them to help steer transformations, explained Renn, who moderated the plenary session throughout the day. "This doesn’t mean that we should abandon representative democracy" – rather, citizens should be able to take an active role in shaping transformations. Other key factors include how measures are implemented and what we choose to prioritise. “We know what we want to achieve – getting there is the challenge. Achieving our goals will require broad cooperation across and between departments, ministries and institutions – coupled with the participation of affected communities and parties involved in implementing measures."

Seddin Declaration for Sustainability and Democracy (in German only)
Sign the Seddin Declaration on openPetition (in German only)

The Seddin Declaration was presented at the platform's plenary session and signed by numerous attendees. The declaration can be signed on the Open Petition platform. Melanie Hauke

In his opening address, Minister Axel Vogel (Agriculture and Environment) highlighted the importance of sustainability in a year packed with elections. Melanie Hauke

Panel discussion on the role of an active civil society as a motor for sustainable development and democracy in Brandenburg, the federal states and federal government. Melanie Hauke

Discussions at the plenary session. Melanie Hauke

The "Market of Opportunities" was a chance to learn more about different sustainability initiatives in Brandenburg, network and collect ideas. Melanie Hauke

RIFS scientist Ortwin Renn moderated the plenary session at Lake Seddin and presented to the committee the "Seddin Declaration for Sustainability and Democracy", which attendees were invited to sign. Melanie Hauke

A panel discussion with state parliamentarians on "Sustainable development in Brandenburg: Impulses from and for state policy", moderated by Prof. Ortwin Renn (f.l.t.r.): Ricarda Budke (Greens), Julian Brüning (CDU), Philip Zeschmann (AfD), Anke Schwarzenberg (Die Linke) und Wolfgang Roick (SPD). Melanie Hauke

The main chamber at the fifth plenary session of Brandenburg Sustainability Platform at Lake Seddin. Melanie Hauke

Futures With a string of elections looming that will see some four billion people worldwide go to the polls in 2024, Brandenburg Sustainability Platform met for its fifth plenary session on the shores of Lake Seddin south of Potsdam. The event attracted over 90 participants, who took part in discussions, workshops and a so-called “market of opportunities”, with a further 50 people following online. Plenarveranstaltung Nachhaltigkeitsplattform BB 01

With a string of elections looming that will see some four billion people worldwide go to the polls in 2024, Brandenburg Sustainability Platform met for its fifth plenary session on the shores of Lake Seddin south of Potsdam. The event attracted over 90 participants, who took part in discussions, workshops and a so-called “market of opportunities”, with a further 50 people following online.

Sustainability Platform Brandenburg Scientific Support for Brandenburg's Sustainability Advisory Board Brandenburg Sustainability Platform and Sustainability Council Science-Society Platforms Sustainability in Brandenburg 0

Nachhaltigkeit als demokratischen Prozess gestalten

slz — Mon, 08 Jan 2024 10:24:05 +0000

Fostering Sustainable Development as a Democratic Process slz Tue, 01/09/2024 - 15:33

Sabine Letz

Sustainability Advisory Board

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A conference between the Advisory Board and government representatives was attended by the state's representative to the federal government, State Secretary Friederike Haase, together with ministers Ursula Nonnemacher (Social Affairs), Jörg Steinbach (Economic Affairs) and Steffen Freiberg (Education).

Prepared by a team led by Ortwin Renn, a former RIFS scientific director, the policy brief argues that efforts to promote sustainability should not be limited to climate and environmental policy and urges the government to embrace a broader concept of sustainable development. “It is important to understand that policies which aim to promote sustainability also have direct and indirect impacts across the economy, society and culture," explained Ortwin Renn, who chairs the body.

State Secretary Friederike Haase commented: “The recommendations of the Sustainability Advisory Board provide valuable guidance for future policy development. It is important that our understanding of sustainability is not limited to a narrow focus on the environment and climate – as important as these issues may be. There is a social dimension to more or less all policy areas and this must also be considered in our efforts to promote sustainability. This dimension underpins public life, social cohesion, and our robust democracy in Brandenburg. The state government will take these insights into account as we continue to develop our sustainability strategy."
In its recommendations, the team of authors defines four key objectives for the state government: Firstly, fairness and social justice, then social cohesion and identification with democratic society, access to and participation in social, economic and cultural life, as well as health and well-being.

Sustainable development is an all-of-goverment challenge

In a joint statement based on the policy brief, the Advisory Board recommends that the state government adopt concrete measures based on an analysis of the actual situation on the ground. In addition to this, social sustainability goals should be identified and pursued in strategies and measures and communicated across all government departments as well as to the public and political actors. "We recommend that the state government carry out a binding sustainability check - before decisions are made on the allocation of funding or the budget," says Prof. Renn.

The Advisory Board also notes that improving social sustainability creates an enabling environment for a peaceful and just society. However, this can only be achieved through an all-of-government approach and with the involvement of all ministries and public agencies. In addition, actors in politics, business, science and civil society must work together to identify problems and challenges and develop solutions for the responsible decision-making bodies.

The Advisory Board also notes that social sustainability can conflict with other sustainability goals. These conflicts must be acknowledged and resolved in order to ensure that sustainability is achieved through democratic process. Achieving lasting change requires the input and support of people of all generations and sectors of society. People should not only be invited to vote on finished concepts – instead, they should also be involved in the development of proposals from the earliest stages and in ways that are both appealing and appropriate. Tensions and conflicts should be identified and acknowledged before initiating efforts to find solutions agreeable to all.

• Policy Brief
• Statement by Brandenburg Sustainability Advisory Board

Brandenburg State Sustainability Advisory Board consists of Prof. Ortwin Renn, Prof. Gesine Grande, Prof. Ottmar Edenhofer, Prof. Uta Steinhardt, Silke Hansen and Rüdiger Kuhn. It was appointed in February 2021 to advise and support the state government in its efforts to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

Citizens should not only be able to vote on ready-made concepts, but should also be involved from the outset in a way that appeals to them and is appropriate for them. Shutterstock/ Rawpixel.com

Governance The Sustainability Advisory Board of Brandenburg state has developed a set of recommendations titled “Social cohesion in an open society – Democracy as a way of life” and presented them to the state government on 8 January 2024. The recommendations are based on a policy brief in which the authors recommend an all-of-government approach to address various issues of social justice and public participation as well as the goal of safeguarding quality of life while remaining within planetary boundaries. 2401_Menschengruppe-Partizipation

The Sustainability Advisory Board of Brandenburg state has developed a set of recommendations titled “Social cohesion in an open society – Democracy as a way of life” and presented them to the state government on 8 January 2024. The recommendations are based on a policy brief in which the authors recommend an all-of-government approach to address various issues of social justice and public participation as well as the goal of safeguarding quality of life while remaining within planetary boundaries.

Sustainability Platform Brandenburg Brandenburg Sustainability Platform and Sustainability Council Science-Society Platforms Sustainability in Brandenburg 0

Werte und Traditionen des klassischen Musikbetriebs behindern Wandel zur Nachhaltigkeit

bsc — Thu, 04 Jan 2024 05:47:09 +0000

Values and Traditions Slow Transition to Sustainability in Classical Concert Industry bsc Thu, 01/04/2024 - 01:46

Dr. Bianca Schröder

Music Sector

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For their study, Gina Emerson and Manuel Rivera conducted interviews with 25 members of a German orchestra, analysed 13 interviews published on the blog of the Orchestra of Change - a well-established sustainability initiative - and compared this material with six "examples of discourse", such as public statements, position papers and descriptions of institutional projects. This analysis revealed significant barriers to change, with both the musicians and institutions primarily interested in specific aspects of sustainable development and largely uncritical of many industry practices.

Self-criticism as a prerequisite for change

According to the researchers, expressions of self-criticism are indicative of a transformative outlook. “The capacity for self-criticism is important as it enables actors to engage with the structures that shape their practice with the aim of contributing to complex change processes. The more self-critical actors are, the greater their awareness of their routines – and the more likely it is that they can facilitate transformations within their institutions," explains Gina Emerson. While self-critical statements were rare in most of the institutional publications examined, the interviews with orchestral musicians revealed a broad range of thinking. The researchers identified three types: the Critically Motivated, the Willing and the Attentive.

Core aspects of contemporary sustainability discourse were identified in all 25 interviews, albeit to varying degrees. Ecological limits figured in many of the interviews, but were rarely explicitly mentioned as “planetary boundaries” or “tipping points”. Very few respondents mentioned the global implications of overshooting these boundaries. Aspects of justice, such as references to inequalities between different parts of the world or different generations, came up frequently among Critically Motivated and Attentive respondents.

Overall, Critically Motivated respondents referred more frequently to global examples of climate change phenomena and were well-informed about both the core and more marginal aspects of sustainability. They were also more likely to question practices common in the classical music industry in relation to touring, for example. The Willing rarely voiced criticism of this kind and instead emphasized the social value of orchestral performance. When questioned about climate change, they frequently referred to their sadness at the destruction of nature.

The Attentive differ from the Critically Motivated in two respects. They tend to have less pronounced feelings about the social mission of classical music, and they did not clearly affirm their own implication in the climate crisis or did not relate this responsibility to the orchestra, but to their roles outside the orchestra – for example as a parent or consumer.

Social dimension of sustainability often neglected

In the publicly accessible blog interviews, there was an even stronger tendency to reduce sustainability to environmental issues, while issues of justice were only addressed by a single interviewee. Respondents often emphasised the positive impact of classical music.

"Overall, a desire for the classical music business to act as a role model was expressed in many of the interviews and documents. But this also reveals a certain dichotomy with respect to the societal relevance of classical music and performance: On the one hand, we see a certain commitment to sustainability – even if this is only in principle and in order to defend one’s societal raison d’être. On the other hand, the priority afforded to musical excellence and 'high performance' is indicative of an impulse to withdraw from society and focus on the arts – a sphere often assumed to be somehow inherently sustainable. And this contradiction hinders the emergence of a deep and transformative sustainability movement within classical music," says Manuel Rivera.

According to the researchers, the historically established value of excellence and the aim of preserving a particular cultural tradition tend to perpetuate the status quo and hinder efforts to establish more sustainable practices in the classical music industry.

Emerson, G., Rivera, M. (2023). Selbstbestätigung und Selbstkritik durch Nachhaltigkeit im klassischen Musikbetrieb. Soziologie und Nachhaltigkeit, Bd. 9, Nr. 2, https://doi.org/10.17879/sun-2023-5255

The Potsdam Chamber Academy (Kammerakademie Potsdam) is among the orchestras that are embracing the idea of sustainability. In July 2023, the musicians offered special one-on-one concerts at RIFS as part of the conference "Developing the Orchestra Sustainably”. Stefan Gloede

There is a growing interest in sustainability among orchestras, ensembles and concert halls in Germany –in terms of reducing their environmental impacts, and in relation to programming, such as creating concert formats that engage with sustainability on a thematic level. Is the classical concert industry contributing to the broader transformation of society towards sustainability? RIFS researchers see room for improvement, finding that many institutions and orchestral musicians are not sufficiently self-critical in their approach to sustainability issues. 1:1-Konzert

A Sustainable Cultural Mission for Music - a New Aspect of Orchestral Excellence Art-Science Cooperations for Sustainability Science-Society Platforms 0

Bridging the Gap? Das CityScienceLab Hamburg als Experimentierfeld für Kunst-Wissenschafts-Kooperationen

slz — Thu, 07 Dec 2023 15:50:44 +0000

Bridging the Gap? CityScienceLab Hamburg: An experimental field for cooperation between art and science slz Thu, 12/07/2023 - 17:46

Teresa Erbach

Club Real/ Organismendemokratie

New ways of collaborating with artists are being trialled at the CityScienceLab in Hamburg. But what goals do artists and scientists pursue when they cooperate? RIFS researcher Teresa Erbach is studying the role of art and culture in transformation processes and evaluated a cooperation programme at HafenCity University Hamburg.

The CityScienceLab (CSL) at HafenCity University Hamburg uses urban data to develop new digital tools for urban planning and digital models of the urban environment. These tools can be used to visualise and simulate complex developments within cities and to support urban stakeholders in decision-making processes. Because the data that they process relates to existing objects and mechanisms, they can be used to forecast future developments, but not to develop new ideas for urban futures or alternative ways of living. Moreover, the emotional aspects of urban development and aesthetic factors tend to fall by the wayside when planners and decision-makers work with digital models.

To compensate for this, in future data storytelling and collaboration with artists are set to play a larger role at the CityScienceLab alongside data analysis and modelling. This September, artists and scientists came together at the CCmCC festival to explore the intersections between art, sustainable urban development and data analysis. In a deep dive into Hamburg’s possible future(s), the festival featured interactive performances, exhibitions, workshops, scientific lectures, serious games, documentary films, immersive experiences and panel discussions.

Visitors to the festival met tree-planting robots guided by local climate data and AI personas that dream of sustainable societies. On the green spaces in front of the building, they explored the debate on invasive species from the perspective of aphids and locust trees, and in the HafenCity quarter, an image generator offered visitors a glimpse of life in HafenCity in 50 years' time. Elsewhere, a film screening provided an entry point for a discussion about the lessons of the past for coastal cities facing the threats of sea level rise and flooding. In a programme rich with scientific and artistic contributions, three projects had a special background as they were developed as part of the CityClimate meets CreativeCoding (CCmCC) programme for art-science cooperation. As part of this collaboration, fifteen artists had created works on the topic of sustainable urban development using the CSL’s digital applications.

What goals do art-science collaborations pursue?

For participants, the festival was a rare and very special opportunity to exchange ideas as artists and scientists on an equal footing. They also praised the cooperation programme ahead of the festival – even if it was dogged by some of the problems often observed in art-science cooperations. One of these problems concerns the clarification and communication of the objectives of such collaborations.

For both artists and scientists, one of the main aims of collaboration is to discover new ways of approaching or thinking about a given topic. Naturally, artists are generally interested in learning about new methods or materials, while scientists – and especially scientific institutions - are often interested in communicating the findings and methods of science to the public. Aspects related to specific projects – such as the inclusion of aesthetic factors in living labs – can also play a role for scientists.

However, these goals are often not properly clarified or communicated in advance. In the case of the project in Hamburg, this was intentionally left open to interpretation. Instead, only a range of topics and methods were specified, which sometimes put the participants in a difficult position, as one of the artists notes:

„The roles and the goals should be clearer. What is the goal? I´m an artist, I do art. Should I help scientists to do science? Or do we do art together? Or what are we doing? Is this rather "shallow" way of work REALLY beneficial to a) science b) environment work c) to art?”

Some artists felt that the expectations connected to the funding they received through the project were unclear and not properly communicated. Scientific institutions often struggle to define and communicate the goals of art-science collaborations and occasionally avoid doing so altogether, possibly due to a lack of experience. However, it may also be due to the fact that there is at least an implicit conflict of objectives. On the one hand, certain expectations or at least hopes are legitimately associated with engaging in art-science collaborations – even if scientific institutions do not clearly define or communicate them. On the other hand, many institutions are wary of imposing any restrictions on participating artists and wish to avoid instrumentalising art.

One possible solution for this dilemma comes from Friedrich von Borries, who suggests in his review of a cooperation programme hosted by the German Environment Agency:

„Die Einbettung von Kunst- und Kulturschaffenden in Projekte, die sich mit umweltpolitischen Fragestellungen beschäftigen, muss nicht die Produktion von „Kunst“ zum Ziel und als Ergebnis haben, sondern könnte durch den Dialog von Kunst und Umweltpolitik etwas „Drittes“ sein, was weder Kunst noch Umweltpolitik ist.“

("The embedding of artists and cultural practitioners in projects that deal with environmental policy issues need not have the production of "art" as its goal and outcome. Rather, by engaging in a dialogue between art and environmental policy, it could give rise to a "third” outcome that is neither art nor environmental policy.")

In contrast to this very open approach, the Fraunhofer Network "Science, Art and Design" issues detailed calls for proposals for the fields of art and design that relate directly to the objectives of individual research projects. Clearly, a broad spectrum of approaches exists, ranging from very open residency programmes to very specific assignments. One insight gained from the CCmCC project in Hamburg is that where the topics and methods of collaboration are specified by a programme, participants tend to want also clearly defined goals. Presumably, the closer the cooperation is and the more it is structured, the more clearly such goals should be defined.

In the case of the CityScienceLab, the cooperation programme was a success despite some issues around the goals and the structure of the programme. The participating researchers found it enriching to engage with unfamiliar perspectives, and the ideas and contacts developed through the programme have paved the way for further transdisciplinary collaboration beyond the project period. The festival was also well received by the public, generated media interest in the work and topics of the CSL, and strengthened and inspired the team at the CSL. In future, however, the focus there will be on longer-term collaborations, with artists joining the CSL for several months at a time in order to enable more in-depth collaboration.

Tools such as these virtual reality glasses allow the visualization and simulation of complex urban developments. Elisa Berdica

Will robots planting trees be used in Hamburg in future to combat the spread of heat islands? Elisa Berdica

Artificial intelligence makes suggestions for climate change adaptation measures to the residents of Hamburg. Elisa Berdica

Art-Science Festival in Hamburg 2311 CityScienceLab Hamburg Fischköpfe eng

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Der Denkfehler beim Netto-Null-Ziel

dha — Wed, 29 Nov 2023 00:26:03 +0000

The Silver Bullet Fallacy of “Net Zero” dha Wed, 11/29/2023 - 02:19

Damian Harrison

RIFS Policy Brief

kam

matg

“Despite the growing understanding of the already disastrous impacts of climate change, there is not yet a political consensus on the need to phase down — let alone phase out — fossil energy sources. This should be cause for serious concern,” comments lead author Kathleen A. Mar, who prepared the policy brief “The Political Logic of Net Zero” together with scientists Charlotte Unger and Stefan Schäfer and RIFS Scientific Director Mark G. Lawrence. Instead, many policymakers and industry actors claim that the problem posed by greenhouse gas emissions can be managed by scaling up technologies to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere or to capture carbon dioxide from emissions sources without having to give up fossil fuels as an energy source. However, this is simply not the case: at present these technologies can only compensate for a fraction of current emissions.

“Expansion of Carbon Dioxide Removal and Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage on a scale that could compensate for continued fossil fuel use at or above current levels — and on a timescale fast enough that would prevent significant irreversible climatic changes — is extremely unlikely to be realized,” explains Mar, who leads the RIFS Research Group on Climate Action in National and International Processes (ClimAct). In light of this, the stark reality is that these technologies only represent a climate “solution” in as much as they go hand in hand with deep emissions reductions — and these can only be achieved by moving away from fossil fuels.

The policy brief also considers the merits of efforts to push for an agreement at COP28 on tripling renewable energy capacity by 2030. This is a laudable goal, and if achieved it will be rightly seen as a success. However, Kathleen Mar predicts: “My expectation is that at COP28, negotiators will come to an agreement on expanding renewable energies, but that, given the economic and political power still held by the fossil fuel industry, the conference will end without an agreement on phasing out fossil fuels. Unfortunately, one without the other will not put us on track to meet agreed-upon climate targets.”

Co-author and RIFS Scientific Director Mark G. Lawrence explains: “While some countries have been able to displace some of their fossil energy use with renewables, the global picture is that renewables have been largely in addition to, rather than substituting for fossil fuels. And while this is certainly preferable to an even more rapid expansion of fossil fuels, it does not put us on a pathway to limit global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C.”

The RIFS researchers argue that in addition to obscuring the need to phase out fossil fuels, a focus on technological solutions to the climate crisis comes at the expense of concerted and determined action to put society on a pathway towards sustainable development. The policy brief cautions that achieving our climate and broader sustainable development goals will require transformations that go beyond energy systems and re-imagine the structures and institutions behind our patterns of consumption, mobility, and food production, among others.

Publication: Mar, K. A., Unger, C., Schäfer, S., & Lawrence, M. G. (2023). The Political Logic of Net Zero. RIFS Policy Brief, 2023(4).
DOI: 10.48481/rifs.2023.030

Deep emissions reductions can only be achieved by moving away from fossil fuels. iStock / ANGHI

A new RIFS Policy Brief warns that the promise of future technologies for the abatement and removal of carbon dioxide is being used to justify inaction on reducing fossil fuels, even though this is incompatible with limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C. Ahead of COP28 in Dubai, the authors urge policymakers to face up to the inescapable reality that achieving the goal of “net zero” greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) will require deep and rapid reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, and that this in turn means nearly completely phasing out fossil fuels. Young shoot in biochar

Climate Action in National and International Processes (ClimAct) Climate Action in National and International Processes (ClimAct) Science-Society Platforms 0

Three Challenges for the CBAM's Transitional Phase

dha — Thu, 09 Nov 2023 09:52:37 +0000

Three Challenges for the CBAM's Transitional Phase dha Thu, 11/09/2023 - 10:52

Djego Abedinaj

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism aims to create a level-playing field by charging an additional fee on carbon intensive goods entering the European single market. Shutterstock / GreenOak

In 2021, as part of the European Union’s “Fit for 55” initiative to reduce European greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030, the European Commission proposed a cross-border carbon pricing mechanism targeting imports of carbon-intensive products: the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). While the EU established an internal carbon pricing scheme as early as 2005 with its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), other countries are still in the early stages of designing or implementing similar schemes. Differences in carbon policy design and regulatory regimes across different countries have led to concerns about “carbon leakage”, whereby efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in one country result in the relocation of economic activities and associated emissions to countries with less stringent policies. The CBAM aims to create a level-playing field by charging an additional fee on carbon intensive goods entering the European single market.

On 1 October 2023, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered into effect, beginning with a transitional phase that will run through to 2026. This provides a two-year learning phase during which stakeholders, including the European Commission, can gradually adjust to the new terms of trading established by the CBAM. The calculation of direct and indirect carbon emissions, quarterly CBAM reporting and monitoring requirements are among the new elements introduced by the mechanism.

The introduction of the world’s first carbon border tariff presents challenges across three areas. First, establishing the new regulatory framework and guiding its implementation represents a considerable administrative challenge for the Commission; secondly, companies exporting to the EU will need to develop institutional capacities and adapt to the new rules of the game; and finally, ensuring the traceability of carbon-intensive goods is likely to present significant challenges due to the complexity of the information and the regulatory scheme’s requirements.

Putting CBAM on track

Following a long and dynamic legislative process, the Commission must now prove the technical feasibility of the mechanism. While experience gained through the European ETS is undoubtedly a valuable resource, the implementation of the CBAM will pose challenges for EU institutions, national authorities, and businesses both within and outside the EU, which will all need to adjust their practices to the requirements of the new scheme.

The Commission will operate a transitional registry that will facilitate efforts to monitor companies’ compliance with quarterly reporting obligations under CBAM. It will also mediate between the so-called competent authorities of member states, which are responsible for implementing and enforcing CBAM and provide access to the registry. These responsibilities are generally assumed by government ministries or environmental agencies in member states.

The rules of the game will also change for EU importers, who are required to consult with the operators of installations producing goods covered by the CBAM in order to report on the quantity of goods imported, total embedded emissions, indirect emissions, and the carbon price due in a country of origin for embedded emissions.

Developing reporting capacities outside the EU

The transitional phase provides exporters from developing countries with the opportunity to scale up their institutional capacities in order to deal with CBAM when it enters into full operation in 2026. The transitional phase provides a margin of flexibility as exporters of goods to the EU adjust to the CBAM’s requirements and develop capacities to calculate and report emissions generated during the production of carbon-intensive goods (embedded emissions) and electricity.

Through to 1 January 2025, companies exporting to the EU can choose from three reporting options: (a) full reporting according to the new methodology (EU method); (b) reporting based on equivalent third country national systems; and (c) reporting based on reference values. From 1 January 2026, all companies exporting to the EU will be required to comply with the mechanism’s requirements.

This flexibility allows exporters to use a wide variety of methods to calculate their relevant emissions. Nevertheless, the reporting requirements for carbon-intensive goods under CBAM are likely to exceed existing regulatory resources in many countries. Competent national authorities and companies will need to boost available capacities in order to facilitate the mechanism’s smooth implementation. And while several developing countries have expressed intent to adopt carbon pricing schemes, few have done so to date.

Traceability and transparency in reporting carbon-intensive goods

In addition to the explicit goals of preventing carbon leakage and establishing a level-playing field, CBAM could pave the way for improved carbon traceability. The focus on carbon-intensive goods during the transitional phase provides an opportunity to overcome the lack of transnational regulatory agreement and gain experience in the technical operation of a cross-border carbon pricing mechanism.

The CBAM Transitional Registry, which will be superseded by a permanent registry on 1 January 2026, is a standardised and secure electronic database and an interface for the submission of CBAM reports by importers of goods covered by the mechanism such as cement, iron, steel, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity and hydrogen. There are concerns that importers could seek to undermine transparent reporting requirements by exploiting the option to declare estimated values when sufficient data on product-embedded emissions or their calculation are unavailable. The reporting requirements have also caused disquiet among exporters, who fear that disclosing emissions could impact competitiveness and lead to disputes with suppliers over embedded carbon emissions.

Finally, although the Implementing Regulation advises that CBAM reports “may be checked” for the purpose of ensuring compliance, it grants declarants considerable flexibility. It is unclear at this time to what extent countries will adopt the CBAM methodology for calculating carbon emissions in their domestic regimes. Overall, a harmonized international regulatory approach will be crucial for effective and transparent traceability. During the transitional phase states and stakeholders will likely need to allocate additional resources in order to enhance capacities ahead of the mechanism’s full implementation. All stakeholders involved in the process will need additional capacities to navigate the technical challenges. However, the implementation of the CBAM marks a milestone in international regulatory carbon pricing.

Container ship and crane

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Gemeinsam zur kommunalen Wärmewende

slz — Tue, 24 Oct 2023 14:59:59 +0000

Cooperation for the Heat Transition slz Wed, 10/25/2023 - 10:56

Sabine Letz

FG Forum for the Future

aku

lwa

Futures

Franco-German Forum for the Future Begins Third Work Cycle

How can the municipal heat transition succeed in Germany and France? The Franco-German Forum for the Future will tackle this question over next 18 months. The project was established under the 2019 Treaty of Aachen and is tasked with strengthening Franco-German dialogue on major social and environmental transformations such as sustainable urban development and the heat transition. Local authorities in both Germany and France face enormous challenges: How can municipalities in Germany meet the demands of the Buildings Energy Act? How can local authorities in France support households seeking to make their properties more energy efficient? And what can be done to increase the share of renewable energies in the heat supply on both sides of the Rhine?

Getting to know each other: Kick-off meeting in Berlin

Over the course of the two-day kick-off meeting held at Stadtwerkstatt Berlin and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the project’s partners – primarily practitioners from local government bodies – got to know each other. The meeting was also attended by representatives from the German municipalities of Göttingen, Greifswald, Hagenow-Land and Hoort, Munich, Chemnitz, Ludwigsburg and Lörrach, as well as Brest, Lyon, Metz and Pau in France. Participants outlined various measures and projects undertaken in their towns to promote the heat transition and discussed the challenges ahead: What will it take to ensure that the heat transition is both sustainable and fair? What constraints do municipalities face? What funding and support is available? And: what are the levers and prerequisites for success? Three thematic workshops were also held, laying the groundwork for future cooperation in this cycle with a focus on municipal heating planning, energy-efficient building refurbishment, and the increased utilization of renewable energies.

In the coming months, the project partners will undertake an in-depth review of their experiences across a wide range of local projects. Project partners from Brest, for example, will report on the development of a renewable energy storage tower and the introduction of a district heating network, Lyon on ambitious climate neutrality goals and programmes for citizen participation, Lörrach on its pilot project for inter-municipal heat planning, and Chemnitz on the possibilities of integrated neighbourhood development.

From local perspectives to national recommendations

The project partners will engage in a process of intensive dialogue and research in order to gain a better understanding of conditions on the ground, enabling participants to develop new ways of tackling structural challenges in both countries. Guided by a steering committee of experts from public administration, civil society and academia, participants will engage in a process of analysis and visionary dialogue to develop recommendations for policymakers at the state and federal levels of both countries, which will be subsequently presented to the governments of Germany and France.

In previous work cycles, the Forum for the Future has tackled issues such as accessing finance for municipal climate measures and promoting sustainable diets.

The Forum’s recommendations for action and content published on YouTube combine local experience with national perspectives to drive ecological transformation processes in both countries. The cooperation pioneered within the framework of the Franco-German Forum for the Future harnesses practical experience and involvement in local processes to support the work of the German and French governments.

DFZW Video

Further information

Website: https://df-zukunftswerk.eu/
YouTube
Twitter / X: https://twitter.com/pour_forum
LinkedIn

The Franco-German Forum for the Future was established in 2019 under Article 22 of the Treaty of Aachen with the aim of advancing processes of societal transformation in the two countries. The Forum brings together stakeholders and relevant actors from civil society, politics, business and academia from Germany and France.

Drawing on the experiences of local actors and intensive dialogue, the Franco-German Forum for the Future sheds light on ecological, social, societal and economic challenges in order to develop potential solutions through cooperation and make recommendations for policymakers in both countries.

Group photo of the kick-off meeting of the German-French Future Work Council in Berlin to mark the start of the third work cycle. DFZW/ Rolf Schulten

Narratives and Mindsets The recently launched third cycle of the Franco-German Forum for the Future – “Plan, Refurbish, Reduce” – will explore projects working to promote the heat transition in towns in Germany and France. In this work cycle, which runs through to late 2024, the project will develop recommendations for action that will shape national policies in both countries. Cooperation between the new participating towns, cities, and districts kicked off with a meeting in Berlin on 18-19 October 2023. 2310 Kick-off meeting Deutsch-Französisches Zukunfstwerk Berlin

The recently launched third cycle of the Franco-German Forum for the Future – “Plan, Refurbish, Reduce” – will explore projects working to promote the heat transition in towns in Germany and France. In this work cycle, which runs through to late 2024, the project will develop recommendations for action that will shape national policies in both countries. Cooperation between the new participating towns, cities, and districts kicked off with a meeting in Berlin on 18-19 October 2023.

Franco-German Forum for the Future Franco-German Forum for the Future Science-Society Platforms 0

A Limping Coalition of the Willing: Why is Transatlantic Cooperation on Clean Steel Lagging Behind?

bsc — Mon, 18 Sep 2023 08:33:59 +0000

A Limping Coalition of the Willing: Why is Transatlantic Cooperation on Clean Steel Lagging Behind? bsc Mon, 09/18/2023 - 10:33

Dr. Charlotte Unger

The production of steel is energy-intensive. Shutterstock/niteenrk

This article was first published on the American-German Institute (agi) website.

The 2020s have arrived as a decade of multiple crises. Beyond their devastating impact, however, these crises have also changed our political debates. For instance, all around the world, we have started to think of “transformation”: To cope with the present challenges, we need to go beyond making small adjustments, efficiency improvements, and grabbing the low-hanging fruits and fundamentally alter our current way of life. The discussion has reached the heart of our economies and, first and foremost, those sectors that ten years ago we thought almost impossible to decarbonize such as the steel industry.

The steel sector is a fundamental building block of countries’ industrial development. In our cars, fridges, buildings, infrastructure, or military equipment, steel is an integral part of our day-to-day lives. In addition to its economic value, this makes steel a politically sensitive and culturally treasured sector. It also creates strong interdependencies with other sectors and diverse supply chains.

International trade and competition are an important dimension of the steel sector, as approximately 25 percent of global steel production is subject to export. The top five crude steel producers are China (ca. 54 percent), India (ca. 6.6 percent), Japan (ca. 4.7 percent), the United States (ca. 4.3 percent), and Russia (3.8 percent). Germany is the largest steel producer in the EU. International competition leads to concerns about investment and carbon leakage. Governments fear that their steel production could relocate to countries with more favorable conditions (e.g., for investments, environmental regulations, subsidies). These characteristics, in addition to the technical challenges that come with decarbonization, make the steel sector “hard to abate” (in terms of emissions). Overall, the steel industry is not on track for a net zero emissions scenario by 2050. Total emissions have risen due to a higher demand for steel, and emissions intensity has stagnated. The reason for this is arguably a lack of progress in fundamental, transformative changes and deep decarbonization.

The good news is, however, that decarbonization is not impossible. Technological solutions, such as increased metal scrap use, electricity based on renewable energies, green hydrogen, and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) can bring the steel sector toward a net zero production and are available or under development. Yet not all technologies are at the stage of market readiness or large-scale implementation. Their establishment requires large state and private investments and support structures.

The struggle to decarbonize the heavy industry sector(s) must be seen against the background of an international climate policy landscape in which countries move at very different paces and which has resulted in a patchwork of approaches. Also, we see an increasing overlap with other policy sectors, first and foremost international trade. Yet, many of the international systems, structures, and procedures, e.g., the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), are not fit to govern the dynamically changing environment. The United States, the EU, and Germany have responded to this situation with the launch and proposal of minilateral initiatives or clubs. They propose to start a policy deal with few or even only two countries or regions and later offer it as an international solution where others can join if they comply with certain conditions.[1]

An example of such a “club” is the potential Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum (GASSA). This deal is especially interesting because it was originally not motivated by climate concerns but was born out of a trade conflict between the United States and the EU. In 2018, then-U.S. President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum (respectively 25 percent and 10 percent), arguing that metal imports threatened national security, based on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This led to a conflict with the EU, which, when no bilateral exemption was negotiated, responded with retaliatory measures in the form of EU tariffs on U.S. exports and a trade dispute under the WTO. Under the following U.S. administration of Joe Biden, the United States and the EU ended the dispute and agreed on a quota for European imports that would not be penalized. However, the agreement foresees only a temporary hold of the tariffs. By October 2023, both parties intend to come up with a permanent solution in the form of GASSA.

GASSA will address both the decarbonization of the steel and aluminum industries and their production overcapacity in the global market. This includes negotiating carbon intensity standards, supporting the production of green steel and aluminum, and creating a green steel and aluminum market. Partners would also refrain from “non-market practices” and examine options to go against such practices from other countries. This is a clause directed at China’s impact on the steel market.

GASSA promises an opportunity to create a safe space for trading clean steel and protecting green investments. However, at the time of writing, only months before the deadline, negotiations are gridlocked. Can we still hope to see an agreement in October 2023, and what are the push and pull factors that influence these negotiations? Very broadly, six main questions can be discussed in this regard.

Six factors that push and pull negotiations on GASSA

First, what shall be the nature of GASSA? Legally we can distinguish between international treaties and more informal arrangements that are followed by domestic regulations in each region. While a treaty is a strong and binding form of cooperation, its decision-making process is very long, and it would require the consent of the U.S. Congress and EU bodies and member states. Thus, a looser regulatory solution seems likely. More pertinent is the question of what measures, instruments, and definitions will be in the arrangement. A whole range of possibilities exists here, from a definition of what clean steel is (and is not) to a common emissions standard for the carbon intensity of steel and aluminum. The deal could also contain concrete measures that complement the standards: tariffs, a border tax, public procurement, a ban on “dirty” steel, or project funding.

The United States and the EU have proposed two opposing design approaches for GASSA. Essentially, the U.S. model foresees a standard independent of production process based on a country’s average carbon intensity. Non-members with more emission-intense steel production would have to pay a tariff when importing to GASSA members. The EU, however, would like to see the United States implement a carbon border tax and/or connect GASSA to the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). It also favors separate, technology-specific (e.g., scrap-based vs. primary steel) accounting approaches. Both proposals have political and technological caveats. Technical harmonization between both approaches is complex and would take significant time.

Second, what economic benefits do negotiation partners expect from GASSA? For the EU, the permanent cancellation of the Section 232 tariffs would be an important step. But also on the U.S. side, experts calculated that the tariffs had a negative effect on the economy, because they raised prices for domestic manufacturers and the downstream industry. Beyond direct potential benefits, the creation of a free trade zone could bring a competitive advantage for low-carbon steel, supporting the capacity for clean steel, while at the same time filtering the “dirty” overcapacity, and, in theory, making “clean” steel cheaper and “dirty” steel more expensive. It might give the push for the creation of a clean steel market among GASSA members and at some point help to prevent carbon or investment leakage. However, historic experiences with steel trade regulations have shown that their effects are more complex. Metal price increases might not be prevented, as it would take some time until, e.g., imports of certain types of steel can be replaced by GASSA members’ production. Also, if excluded, China could employ expensive retaliation measures.

Third, with which domestic policies must GASSA be reconciled? The EU has named its new flagship climate policy, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, as its main concern in the GASSA negotiations. The EU CBAM also targets the steel imports to the EU, levying a fee according to the product’s embedded carbon. Starting in October 2023, U.S. steel companies fall under the EU CBAM pilot phase. It is yet unclear what a steel producer with a U.S.-average carbon intensity will have to pay in 2028, when payment obligations start. For now, the U.S. steel industry has not shown much concern, possibly because U.S. steel production is already less carbon-intensive than that of the EU. Also, only a rather small segment of U.S. exports would fall under the regulation. Nevertheless, GASSA negotiations might be lagging behind because much of the responsible policymakers’ capacity is taken up with getting the EU CBAM running by October 2023. EU policymakers would have to make certain that GASSA is technically compatible with the EU CBAM and not, for example, jeopardize the carbon price established there at the same time. Thus, from a policymaking perspective, it might simply be easier to get the first in place and running before agreeing to a new scheme.

Questions remain about how GASSA’s measures would be implemented and enforced to create a substantial value for the environment, but also about how a bilateral deal could then be turned into the intended global solution.

Fourth, which elements of the domestic policy cycle influence the negotiations on GASSA? The list of domestic policies and politics that influence the negotiations on GASSA is potentially very long, but two examples can be highlighted here. In the United States, the public debate has started to be dominated by the presidential elections that will be held in November 2024. Not only can the outcome of these elections influence the future of GASSA, but the electoral campaign also affects the “appetite” to make decisions. Both the administration and the Republican opposition likely will avoid domestically sensitive topics, such as increasing costs, inflation, or provisions that raise fears of loss and disadvantages among interest groups and the public. For instance, the Biden administration might hesitate to upset steelworkers in the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, which are crucial to his reelection. Although the rotating EU presidencies do not have comparable power, in 2023/24, there will be elections of the EU Parliament, a new EU Commission president will be appointed, and several EU member countries will hold elections. These developments might affect the EU’s positive inclination toward multilateral decarbonization approaches.

Fifth, which international developments affect the negotiations on GASSA? Lack of progress globally in mitigating global warming increases the pressure on industry. Yet, what likely creates a stronger impetus for progress in the negotiations for GASSA is China’s general dominance of steel production, many of the manufacturing and downstream sectors, and clean technology supply chains. There is a strong belief that China’s methods to boost its steel sector create unfair advantages and lead to global overcapacity and the lower prices of Chinese steel. GASSA negotiations are part of a complex and politically heated geopolitical situation, characterized by multiple crises ranging from COVID-19 to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the subsequent food and energy crises, and further bilateral diplomatic clashes. Also, the global and domestic availability of renewable energies, hydrogen, CCS technologies, and metal scrap plays a crucial role. In general, it can be said that the United States is pursuing a much bolder approach toward China, whereas in the EU and Germany, governments and industrial groups are more hesitant.

Sixth, how do stakeholders in the steel sector push or hold back these negotiations? Many stakeholders are involved in the steel sector, such as environmental and social NGOs, unions, the steel companies’ interest groups, and the car and construction industries. What U.S. and EU industry groups have in common is their demand for clear and ideally harmonized decarbonization rules, e.g., on Measuring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems. One main obstacle for the GASSA negotiations on both sides of the Atlantic is concerns that carbon standards could be arbitrary. Both regions have different starting points. In the EU, steel production is predominantly based on the Blast Furnace (BF) technology (61 percent of the crude steel production). In the United States, more companies use the less emissions-intensive Electric Arc Furnace (EAF) technology (68 percent EAF and 32 percent BF). EAFs use mostly scrap steel and can become even cleaner through the use of renewable energies. Steel industry groups fight over whether to use a one-size-fits-all carbon intensity-based standard (independent of the applied technology) or a sliding scale/multiple standards approach (that distinguishes between scrap based and primary steel). It can be assumed that many U.S. steel producers pressure their negotiators to pursue the one-size-fits-all standard, whereas EU industries seek to prevent this.

The discussion becomes politically sensitive because it is tied to perceived fairness and distributional concerns. For instance, some groups argue that the “effort” behind each ton of reduced emissions should be rewarded. With such an approach a BF producer, who achieves a relatively clean production but which is still dirtier than an EAF facility, would be rewarded. If GASSA’s standards were connected to financial benefits, e.g., the eligibility for governmental subsidies or procurement programs, there could be strong distributional impacts. The situation becomes even more complex when taking into account the different downstream industries. Overall, steel industry groups in the United States and the EU have historically been very successful in pushing policymaking in their favor.

What is a likely outcome in October?

The above discussion shows that many aspects remain complex and unresolved for the launch of a GASSA club. Also, this brief essay has only discussed the immediately relevant aspects for cooperation between the United States and the EU. Questions remain about how GASSA’s measures would be implemented and enforced to create a substantial value for the environment, but also about how a bilateral deal could then be turned into the intended global solution. For instance, how could crucial partners from the Global South, where large amounts of emissions can be expected in the future and trade relations for steel, hydrogen, and steel-based products will take place, be engaged?

Several possible outcomes from the GASSA negotiations can be envisioned. The most likely scenario is that negotiations will be postponed until after the U.S. elections and a new EU Commission is in place and be resumed in mid-2025. The EU and the United States could temporarily extend the current quota rule for the Section 232 tariffs. A more favorable scenario for climate policy would be that partners can at least agree on a very broad framework deal that sends a signal to the world that the United States and the EU are seriously committed to setting strict rules for steel decarbonization. Finally, the most negative scenario would be “no agreement” and the reimposition of Section 232 tariffs paired with the EU’s retaliation measures, leading to a renewed trade conflict. Such a situation, together with unilateral actions to counteract market overcapacity and protect decarbonization measures, could lead to a conflictual spiral at a moment when cooperation and solidarity among allies are most needed.[2] The international climate conference of the United Nations in November/December (COP 28 in Dubai) might bring a glimmer of hope. Many governments look at this event as an opportunity to make important—potentially prestige-building—announcements, and thus this would be an ideal moment for the United States and the EU to come forward with a GASSA club.

[1] Sectoral initiatives, clubs, and pledges have increased in the last few years in the climate policy landscape; examples are the G7 Climate Club led by Germany or the Global Methane Pledge.

[2] This essay builds on empirical information gathered by the author in multiple interviews, talks, and at observed events.

Supported by the DAAD with funds from the Federal Foreign Office (FF).

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